Agroterrorism refers to the deliberate use of biological agents to destroy crops, livestock, or food supply chains. Regarded as a low-frequency but potentially high-impact threat, it has never given rise to an indisputable large-scale case. Europe’s reference risk scenarios draw on real epizootics such as foot-and-mouth disease and African swine fever. International frameworks, FAO, IPPC, Interpol, EU CBRN, attempt to address the threat, but face major operational limitations, notably the near-impossibility of distinguishing an accidental introduction from a deliberate act in real time.
Before it became a subject of scientific assessment, agroterrorism was the stuff of fiction: novelists and screenwriters imagined deliberately triggered epidemics designed to destroy an economy or starve a population. What once seemed like the realm of science fiction took on a different dimension in 2001, when the United Kingdom experienced the largest foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in its history, six million animals slaughtered and more than eight billion pounds in economic losses. It was not a malicious act, yet its impact closely mirrored the scenarios conjured by fiction writers. It is precisely this disproportion between massive consequences and an apparently minor initial cause that led international agencies to take the threat seriously.
1. What is agroterrorism?
Agroterrorism can be defined as the deliberate and malicious use of biological agents : bacteria, viruses, fungi, toxins, by an individual, organisation, or state, with the aim of causing damage to plants (crops, trees, agricultural produce) or livestock, or of disrupting how they are used (production, marketing, processing, consumption). Such an act also seeks to undermine public confidence in government and to generate fear, including through the response measures themselves, such as mass culling, which inevitably provokes controversy. The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) and Interpol define it as a subset of agrocrime: the deliberate release of pathogens to cause disease or death in animals, with the intent to intimidate or coerce a state or its population.
2. A low-frequency threat with high potential impact
No indisputable case of large-scale agroterrorism has ever been recorded. A handful of isolated incidents have nonetheless provided insights into possible dissemination methods. Contamination of agricultural food products with mercury or cyanide by terrorist groups in the 1980s left a lasting impression. That said, the malicious use of plant pathogens poses little direct risk to human health, as plant diseases are generally not transmissible to animals or humans. Some plant parasites can, however, produce toxic compounds that may find their way into semi-processed products, rendering them unfit for consumption.
Given the scarcity of documented cases, the risk appears diffuse and difficult to quantify. Agroterrorism is also unlikely to be a method of choice for terrorist groups, as it offers no single, high-visibility media target. It could, however, serve as a secondary vector: a means of destabilising a society already shaken by a conventional terrorist attack, enabling an actor with limited resources to achieve effects far exceeding the means deployed. International agencies therefore regard agroterrorism as a low-frequency but potentially high-impact threat, with modern agriculture particularly exposed due to its open environments, dispersed assets, and tightly interconnected supply chains.
3. Foot-and-mouth disease and African swine fever: Europe’s reference risk scenarios
Terrorist acts targeting livestock are currently considered the most plausible form of agroterrorism: biological agents could be deliberately introduced into farms, triggering rapidly spreading diseases with major economic and public health consequences. In Europe, risk scenarios have been developed on the basis of epizootics that occurred in the 2000s — foot-and-mouth disease (with new outbreaks in Europe in 2025 and 2026) and African swine fever (which first appeared in Belgium in 2018) — both of which have characteristics that make them potentially exploitable for malicious purposes:
- extremely high contagiousness,
- strong environmental persistence: the viruses can cause delayed indirect contamination through equipment, clothing, and foodstuffs, making it very difficult to trace the source of an introduction after the fact,
- no risk to human health, making them relatively safe to handle for a potential perpetrator,
- a disproportionate economic and commercial leverage relative to the effort required to introduce them: a single outbreak immediately triggers restricted zones, international trade embargoes, and large-scale preventive culling, far beyond the number of animals directly affected. The 2001 UK outbreak provides the most thoroughly documented illustration: six million animals slaughtered and more than eight billion pounds in economic losses, stemming from a single farm.
No official assessment has concluded that a deliberate act was involved. Investigations have consistently pointed to biosecurity failures rather than intentional sabotage.
For the time being, the agroterrorist threat remains primarily an object of prospective assessment rather than a documented phenomenon.
4. Biosecurity and prevention: international frameworks in place
The globalisation of the economy, accelerating transport and trade, technological advances, and a heightened awareness of biodiversity issues have structurally weakened phytosanitary and zoo-sanitary borders. A range of mechanisms have been put in place to monitor plant and animal diseases and to conduct risk assessments.
4.1. The FAO framework
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) brings together under the concept of biosecurity three closely interrelated sectors, food safety, plant health, and animal health, covering everything from food production to the introduction of harmful organisms, zoonoses, GMOs, and invasive species. It regards the management of agroterrorist risk as a comprehensive undertaking, spanning biosecurity on farms through to the monitoring of international trade flows.
4.2. The IPPC
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC, 1951) aims to protect cultivated and wild plants by preventing the introduction and spread of harmful organisms, in order to ensure food security and facilitate trade. It enables countries to analyse the risks facing their plant resources and to apply science-based measures. In particular, it develops International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs), which form the regulatory framework for legally tracing the undeclared introduction of a harmful organism.
4.3. Interpol and the fight against agrocrime
For Interpol, agrocrime spans a continuum from organised food fraud to agroterrorism, with the same networks or the same biosecurity gaps potentially exploited for ordinary criminal ends or for deliberately destructive purposes. The organisation works in coordination with states and other international bodies to prevent risks and enforce legislation.
4.4. The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative
Launched in 2010 by the European Union, the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative brings together 63 partner countries with the aim of promoting peace, stability, and conflict prevention. Since 2024, it has included a dedicated “food chain security” component. Its mandate covers CBRN risks of criminal or terrorist origin, not merely accidental or natural ones. Unlike the other frameworks described here, which address the introduction of pathogens without prejudging their origin, this initiative explicitly incorporates the hypothesis of a deliberate act, whether criminal or terrorist, into its risk assessments, national action plans, and field exercises.
These frameworks nonetheless share a common operational limitation: according to WOAH data, only 40% of its members meet the minimum capacity requirements for animal health emergency preparedness. Moreover, veterinary services and law enforcement agencies still operate largely in silos, with different terminologies, poorly defined roles, and no formal collaboration frameworks, which significantly hampers the implementation of a coordinated response in cases where deliberate malicious action is suspected.
The boundary between accidental introduction and deliberate act currently remains virtually impossible to establish in real time. This ambiguity places biosecurity at the heart of agroterrorist risk management.
5. Frequently asked questions
What is agroterrorism and how does it differ from agrocrime?
Agroterrorism is the deliberate use of biological agents — such as bacteria, viruses, or toxins — to damage crops or livestock with the aim of destabilising a state or society. It is a subset of the broader concept of agrocrime, which also encompasses organised food fraud. According to Interpol and WOAH, the key distinction lies in intent: agroterrorism explicitly seeks to intimidate or coerce a government or population.
Has large-scale agroterrorism ever been confirmed?
To date, no indisputable case of large-scale agroterrorism has been recorded. A few isolated incidents of agricultural product contamination were documented in the 1980s. Major epizootics, such as the 2001 UK foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, have consistently been attributed to biosecurity failures rather than deliberate acts. The threat therefore remains primarily prospective — a subject of risk assessment rather than documented history.
Why is foot-and-mouth disease considered a potential agroterrorism agent?
Foot-and-mouth disease has several characteristics that make it potentially exploitable for malicious purposes: extremely high contagiousness, strong environmental persistence enabling delayed indirect contamination, no risk to human health (making it relatively safe to handle), and enormous economic leverage. A single outbreak can trigger international trade embargoes and mass preventive culling far beyond the animals directly affected, as illustrated by the 2001 UK crisis.
Which international bodies monitor the agroterrorism threat?
Several organisations share this responsibility: the FAO coordinates biosecurity across food safety, plant health, and animal health at global level; the IPPC regulates plant protection through international phytosanitary standards; Interpol combats agrocrime in coordination with member states; and the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative, launched in 2010, has included a dedicated food chain security component since 2024, explicitly addressing risks of criminal or terrorist origin.
How can a deliberate agroterrorist act be distinguished from a natural outbreak?
This is precisely the central difficulty: the boundary between accidental introduction and deliberate act is currently virtually impossible to establish in real time. The same pathogens, the same contamination pathways, and the same symptoms can result from negligence or from a malicious act. This ambiguity explains why preventive biosecurity plays a central role in agroterrorist risk management, and why international coordination between veterinary services and law enforcement remains essential.